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PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFORM RADAR
SPEED DETECTION ACT
Continuous-emission microwave radar units' are currently used by traf-
fic law enforcement agencies in every state.2 Speeding citations based
on radar evidence constitute the vast majority of all traffic violations in
many communities. 3 Radar dominates this field because it is an effective
and economical method of enforcing speed restrictions. Although equip-
ment4 and method of operation 5 vary, all radar systems are characterized
by general ease of operation," capacity to detect only those vehicles trav-
eling in excess of the speed limit, 7 comparatively low acquisition and
1 The typical radar device used to detect the speed of motor vehicles transmits a
continuous beam of microwaves. When such waves are reflected by a moving object,
the frequency changes in a ratio to the speed of the intercepted object. By measuring
the change of frequency, the speed may be determined. The principle is based upon
the Doppler effect. Kopper, The Scientific Reliability of Radar Speedmeters, 33 N.C.L.
REV. 343 (1955), reprinted in 16 MD. L. REV. 1 (1956) (discussion of the theory, prin-
ciples, and application of radar speed detection devices); Carosell & Coombs, Radar
Evidence in the Courts, 32 DICTA 323 (1955) (catalog of the technical limitations of
radar speed detection devices).
Radar speed detection devices have been referred to as radar speedmeters, speed-
alyzers, police radar, traffic radar, and continuous emission microwave radar. In this
article the devices are merely called radar, unless some distinction is required by the
context. Military radar (pulse radar) has been the object of much experimentation and
technological research, but should not be confused with traffic radar. See note 11
infra.
2 Greenwald, Scientific Evidence in Traflic Cases, 59 J. CRIM. L. & P.S. 57 (1968).
See note 54 and accompanying text infra for specific state statutory provisions.
3 Interviews with Paul H. Bibeau of Brennan and Bibeau, P.C., attorneys for City
of Farmington Hills and Township of West Bloomfield, Michigan, in Farmington
Hills, and with Cpl. Richard Lamphier, West Bloomfield Township Police Depart-
ment, in West Bloomfield Township, Aug. 6, 1973.
4 Several companies manufacture radar devices for use in traffic law enforcement.
The most commonly used device in Michigan is the Stephenson Mark VI Speedalyzer.
The Michigan State Police have recently experimented with units supposedly capable
of measuring speed from a moving police vehicle. Interview with Carlton B. Spencer of
CBS Specialties, in Orchard Lake, Michigan, Aug. 6, 1973.
5 Although newer units are mobile enough to allow one officer to monitor the radar
and then pursue the speeding vehicle, older units required two officers: one monitoring
the radar unit set up on the roadside and a second officer in a chase vehicle further
along the road. Forkosch, Speeding and Due Process, 28 FoRDHlM L. REV. 115, 118
(1959), quoting from People v. Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562, 564, 147 N.E.2d 728, 729,
170 N.Y.S.2d 335, 336 (1958). One police force used two officers in another way.
While an officer in the radar car wrote a citation for one driver, he continued to
monitor traffic flowing in the opposite direction and radioed the second officer if any
other driver exceeded the speed limit. A radar unit can measure speed in either
direction of travel (Kopper, supra note 1, at 352), although there is some question as
to its accuracy of function in both directions (Carosell & Coombs, supra note 1, at
342).
6 Kopper, supra note 1, at 353.
7 For example, the Model 700C Speedminder functions as follows: The operator
turns a dial to the prevailing speed limit. When a vehicle reaches or exceeds this limit,
a buzzer sounds, alerting the operator, and the machine automatically clamps the
meter at the top speed of the violator. STEPHENSON RADAR SPEEDALYZER OPERATOR'S
MANUAL 12 [hereinafter cited as STEPHENSON MANUAL].
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maintenance costs," and the potential to measure the speed of an auto-
mobile in its zone" with accuracy."' Radar creates an aura of authority
and authenticity that tends to reduce the number of contested speeding
citations." In some communities, public awareness of traffic radar use
has been credited with deterring speeding, -'2 which is a major factor'' in
thousands of traffic fatalities annually occurring on American highways.'"
Thus, properly used radar contributes significantly to traffic law enforce-
ment and can substantially decrease traffic deaths'; by reducing the
amount of illegal speeding.
Speed measurements by radar are subject to error because of inherent
technical limitations and misuse by police authorities. Technical limita-
tions include the effect exerted on radar readings by objects other than
automobiles. Any moving object' ; within the radar beam will register on
the radar speedmeter. Various environmental conditions can affect radar
8 The cost of the Model 700C Speedminder is approximately $1200. The average
annual maintenance bill is approximately $80. Interview with Carlton B. Spencer of
CBS Specialties, in Orchard Lake, Michigan, Aug. 6, 1973.
')The field of operation of radar is known as its zone of influence or radar beam.
While the dimensions of the beam vary from unit to unit, the beam is cone-shaped
with an angle of from twenty to forty degrees. At a height of three feet, the beam
extends for at least 150 feet on older models. 11 Am. JUR. Proof of Facts 19 (Supp.
1972). The Stephenson Model 600 can measure the speed of cars up to 1500 feet
away. STEPHENSON MANUAL, supra note 7, at 4. See also Carosell & Coombs, supra
note 1, at 325.
10 Kopper, supra note 1, at 350-51. Contra, Carosell & Coombs, supra note 1,
passim.
11 Carosell & Coombs, supra note 1, at 323. Most individuals are familiar with the
general phenomenon of radar through television, motion pictures, or military experi-
ence and make the mistaken assumption that traffic radar and sophisticated military
radar are identical. Thus the average motorist is not likely to challenge a citation
based on a system which he believes is used to direct missiles to distant targets. Even
in its early stages of development, radar evidence was not contested. Id. at 357.
12 See note 3 supra. The evidence to date is only anecdotal. A carefully designed
and controlled empirical study is desirable to validate this observation.
1:3 R. GOEN, DRASTIC MEASURES FOR REDUCING TRAFFIC CASUALTIES (1965); Green-
wald, supra note 2, at 57.
14 For example, traffic fatalities on all highways in the fifty states and the District
of Columbia totaled 53,907 in 1971. FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T
OF TRANSPORTATION, FATAL AND INJURY ACCIDENT RATES ON FEDERAL-AID AND OTHER
HIGHWAY SYSTEMS (1972).
15 Any attempt to lower speed limits nationally, in response to the current energy
shortage, must concern itself with the concomitant enforcement problem and the
utility of radar in this regard cannot be ignored. The effect of the new nationwide
fifty-five miles per hour speed limit is yet to be determined.
16 Carosell & Coombs, supra note 1, at 336-37. Called "The Achilles Heel of
Radar" by the Joint Board on Scientific Information Policy in its report, ELECTRONICS
WARFARE, REPORT ON RADAR COUNTERMEASURES, cited id. at 336, outside forces
impinging directly on the radar unit have a great effect on the reliability of the
measurements obtained. Movements of trees, birds, and pedestrians register on the
radar. Even shaking a key ring near the antenna head of the radar unit may produce
a "speed" of forty miles per hour. Id. at 338. One police officer was baffled by a
rhythmic reading fluctuating between zero and twenty miles per hour until he looked
through the "peep-scope" aiming device and saw a lawn sprinkler spraying water
in and out of the radar beam.
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readings.' 7 The operation of diathermy equipment' 8 or the transmission
of radio signals 9 in the vicinity also negates the reliability of the radar
unit. Misuse by radar operators, the other major source of error, occurs
since many officers lack formal training in the principles of radar and their
application to traffic law enforcement. This lack of training may lead to
careless identification of the offending vehicle 20 and inaccurate testing or
improper calibration 2 1 of the radar unit. Therefore, the social utility of
radar speed detection devices may be offset by the possibility that errone-
ous speed measurements could be used as evidence against motorists.
A uniform radar speed detection act could provide for nationwide reg-
ulation to maximize the benefits of radar speed detection, while prevent-
ing abuses. A uniform approach is preferable both to ensure fair and con-
sistent treatment of drivers charged with similar offenses and to promote
interstate cooperation.2 2 The current, if overdue, reevaluation of traffic
laws by state and local governments2 3 provides an unparalleled opportu-
nity to consider the desirability of a uniform radar act. The Secretary of
Transportation has already indicated that uniform vehicle codes and laws
relating to highway safety' 4 are fundamentally important and, as required
by the Federal Highway Safety Act of 1966,25 has promulgated standards
concerning state traffic codes and laws.
The Highway Safety Program is designed to "eliminate all major varia-
tions in traffic codes, laws, and ordinances on given aspects of highway
safety . -26 The background related by the Secretary is pertinent to a
policy of uniformity.
[B]asic motor vehicle codes and traffic laws should be made
uniform throughout the Nation. The laws in the field are liter-
ally a jungle of confusion. There is a vast array of changing and
conflicting traffic laws and control systems as we drive from
State to State.27
A Highway Safety Program Standard recommends plans that will "further
17 Radar is used in weather forecasting to detect rain. The effect of water on radar
is to "muddle" a reading or create a "bogey." A "bogey" is a blip, caused by rain
or small objects, which appears on a radar screen and is often misinterpreted as some
other object, e.g., ducks misinterpreted as a large airplane. See Note, Radar and the
Law, 10 S. TEX. L.J. 269 (1968).
18 Kopper, supra note 1, at 351. Greenwald, supra note 13, at 59.
19 STEPHENSON MANUAL, supra note 7, at 4.
20 Carosell & Coombs, supra note 1, at 341-42.
211 d. at 344-45.
2 2 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, CONSTI-
TUTION, in TRAFFIC LAWS ANNOTATED 816 (1972). Increased resources for techno-
logical developments will also result from the adoption of a uniform act. The Act
may lead to a pooling of information from various states regarding common problems.
2 3 NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS AND ORDINANCES, TRAFFIC
LAWS ANNOTATED 815 (1972).
24 23 C.F.R. pt. 204 (1968).
25 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1970).
2 6 HIGHWAY SAFETY PROGRAM STANDARD 6, CODES AND LAWS, 23 C.F.R. pt. 204
(1968).
27 Id.
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the adoption of appropriate aspects ... of the Uniform Vehicle Code" and
an examination of all state traffic laws based upon a comparison to the
Uniform Vehicle Code.2 8 Inclusion of a uniform radar speed detection
act in the Uniform Vehicle Code would further the policies of the De-
partment of Transportation and the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws.
This article traces the judicial treatment of radar, reviews statutory at-
tempts to regulate radar usage, and proposes a uniform act as an effective
and consistent approach to ensure the proper use of radar.
I. THE COMMON LAW OF RADAR
Although military radar was invented early in World War II, radar prin-
ciples were not used in automobile speed detection until the late 1940's.
Prosecutions based on radar evidence began soon thereafter, but since
traffic cases rarely reach a state's highest court, judicial treatment tends to
be inconsistent. Many potentially dispositive questions are never raised,
because the defendant either did not go to trial or chose not to appeal.
Thus, courts in states that have no statutes regulaing radar have failed to
deal with many problems arising from radar speed detection. There has
also been inconsistent treatment of the evidentiary effect to be given radar
readings. However, some consistent patterns of analysis can be discerned
in states without radar regulation statutes.
A. Proof of Reliability
Prior to 1955 and in the absence of a statutory presumption, state
courts required expert testimony2 9 to establish the general reliability of
radar in measuring speed, before a conviction could be based on radar
evidence. Since then, courts have been increasingly willing to take judi-
cial notice of radar's reliability20 The treatment accorded radar has been
analogized to that given photography, radiology, blood tests, and other
scientific discoveries. 3' Judicial notice of the general reliability of radar
is not, however, judicial notice of the accuracy of the particular unit re-
lied upon in the specific case.A'2
The courts that have taken judicial notice of radar reliability despite
28 Id. See also note 23 supra.
29 See, e.g., State v. Moffitt, 48 Del. 210, 100 A.2d 778 (1953); People v. Offermann,
204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1953).
3
oSee, e.g., Everight v. City of Little Rock, 230 Ark. 695, 326 S.W.2d 796 (1959);
State v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 216 A.2d 625 (1966); People v. Abdallah, 82 Ill.
App. 2d 312, 226 N.E. 2d 408 (1967); State v. Gerdes, 291 Minn. 353, 191 N.W.2d
428 (1971); State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35 (1955); People v. Magri, 3
N.Y.2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 72.8, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1958); Wilson v. State, 328S.W.2d
311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959) (semble).
.1 Baer, Radar Goes to Court, 33 N.C.L. REV. 355, 365 (1955); Note, Evidence
Judicial Notice - Radar, 14 Sw. L.J. 394 (1960).
32 State v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 216 A.2d 625 (1966).
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continuing comment concerning its inherent technical limitations,33 have
been moved 34 by the arguments offered by radar's leading proponent,
Dr. John Kopper.15 Unfortunately, the practices recommended 36 to en-
sure radar's reliability have not always been adopted by the courts37
Some states judicially notice radar's reliability without requiring the pro-
cedures necessary to assure reliability.
B. Proof of Accuracy
Proof of general reliability may be accomplished through judicial notice
and once established need not be reestablished, 8 but the accuracy of
the particular unit relied upon must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
in each trial.3 9 Generally the prosecution introduces evidence of several
tests designed to show that the unit accurately measured the speed of
vehicles both before and after the arrest of the defendant. This evidence
tends to support the inference 40 that the unit was also accurate at the
time defendant's vehicle passed through its beam. 41
There are at least four different methods42 of testing accuracy, ranging
from an internalized tuning fork calibration 43 to cheks against a master
speedometer both in laboratories and in the field.4 4 Although the nature
and quality of some of 'these tests have been challenged successfully, 4
3 Carosell & Coombs, supra note 1; Evans, supra note 17; Greenwald, supra note
2; McCarter, Legal Aspects of Police Radar, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 455 (1967);
O'Brien, Radar Speed Detection in Illinois, 56 ILL. B.J. 296 (1967). See also notes
16-19 and accompanying text supra.
34 See State v. Gerdes, 291 Minn. 353, 355, 191 N.W.2d 428, 430 (1971) (collecting
citations).
35 Kopper, supra note 1.
36 Id. at 353.
37 Thomas v. City of Norfolk, 207 Va. 12, 15, 147 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1966).
38 McCormick, Scientific Evidence in Traffic Cases-Some Legal Problems, 4 S.
TEX. L.J. 193 (1959); Note, supra note 31.
39 Citations collected in Russell, Radar Speedmeters in Court, 6 LAw NOTES 69
(1970) and Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 822. 837-57 (1973).
40 Woodbridge, Radar in the Courts, 40 VA. L. REV. 809, 815 (1954).
41 See note 9 supra.
42 Forkosch, supra note 5, at 134; Kopper, supra note 1, at 353; McCarter, supra
note 33, at 457; McCormick, supra note 34, at 200; O'Brien, supra note 33, at 301;
Russell, supra note 39, at 70; Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 822, 842 (1973). The types of
testing include internal tests of the unit by electronic experts to check the crystal
detector, calibrations, and cavity output, tuning fork tests (holding a sounding tuning
fork in front of the radar antenna to see if the speed registered matches the frequency
output of the tuning fork), run-through tests by other police vehicles with accurate
speedometers, and tests based on internalized transmission of a signal corresponding
to a given speed reading. Variations of these types of tests produce several additional
methods for ascertaining the accuracy of the unit.
43 State v. Gerdes, 291 Minn. 353, 191 N.W.2d 428 (1971) (holding the internalized
tuning fork calibration to be "bootstrapping" and insufficient proof of accuracy).
44 E.g., People v. Sachs, 1 Misc. 2d 148, 147 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1955).
45 State v. Gerdes, 291 Minn. 353, 191 N.W.2d 428 (1971); City of St. Louis v.
Boecker, 370 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. App. 1963); People v. Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562, 147
N.E.2d 728, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1958).
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some courts nevertheless refuse to consider challenges concerning the ac-
curacy of the testing devices themselves, arguing that there must be a
"point of faith" somewhere. 46
C. Proof of Operator Expertise
Proof that the operator of the radar unit was sufficiently trained so as
to have acquired the necessary expertise must be introduced in each
case. 41 The amount of expertise required varies. One court held that a
ninety-minute session with an "experienced" traffic officer was suffi-
cient, 48 while another held that attendance for several days at a radar
institute run by an electronics engineer was clearly adequate. 41' Most
courts50 appear to require the officer to spend at least a day familiarizing
himself with the actual operation of the unit. There is no requirement,
however, that the officer understand the theory of radar speed detec-
tion.' Proponents argue that the one-and-a-half-hour training session ap-
proved by some courts is adequate,52 but this is subject to doubt.-:
II. THE STATUTORY LAW OF RADAR
Statutes 54 regulating radar deal with several questions never confronted
by courts, including special arrest and evidentiary provisions. These stat-
utes allow a legislature to respond to problems that might never receive a
judicial hearing. The importance of legislative regulation is especially
clear in states having statutes dealing with problems of warrantless arrests,
warning signs, and speed traps.
46 State v. Snyder, 184 Neb. 465, 168 N.W.2d 530 (1969); Peterson v. State, 163
Neb. 669, 80 N.W.2d 688 (1957); State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35 (1955);
People v. Stephens, 52 Misc. 2d 1070, 227 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1967).
47 State v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 216 A.2d 625 (1966); People v. Abdallah, 82
Ill. App. 2d 312, 226 N.E.2d 408 (1967); Honeycutt v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d
421 (Ky. 1966); State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. App. 1959); People v. Magri,
3 N.Y.2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 728, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1958).
48 See State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. App. 1959); Hardaway v. State, 202
Tenn. 94, 302 S.W.2d 351 (1957).
49 People v. Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 728, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1958).
50 See, e.g., People v. Stankovich, 119 Il. App. 2d 187, 255 N.E.2d 461 (1970).
51 See, e.g., People v. Abdallah, 82 III. App. 2d 312, 226 N.E.2d 408 (1967).
52 Kopper, supra note 1, at 353.
53 The author spent one morning observing traffic in a Detroit suburb with an ex-
perienced traffic law enforcement officer in a radar-equipped car. Although the me-
chanics of switching the unit on and watching the needle register a single vehicle's
speed were easily mastered, the ability to distinguish the car registering on the unit
when both lanes had strings of five cars in them was never gained. The officer ad-
mitted that he observed the radar reading only on two-lane roads, as he was unable
"to make out which car it is" on a three- or four-lane road. See note 3 supra.
54 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.058 (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 68-2101 to -2113
(Supp. 1972); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, § 11-602 (1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
29, § 1254 (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 91 (1957); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 8176.5 (Supp. 1970); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-7, 108.02 (Supp. 1968); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 39-03-15 (Supp. 1971); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.091 (Baldwin 1971);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.112 (4), (5) (1971-72); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1002 (d.1)
(1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-198, -198.1, -198.2 (1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
176C-6-7 (1966).
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A. Arrest Provisions
1. Conditions of Arrest-Speeding violations are typically misdemean-
ors5 - and an officer may not arrest a misdemeanant unless the offense
was committed in his presence.5 6 States without statutory radar regula-
tion have not confronted the question of the validity of an arrest by an
officer who did not see the defendant speeding. Six states 7 provide that a
warrantless arrest may be made based solely upon evidence from a
radar unit. Generally the arresting officer is required to be in uniform
and must display his badge of authority.5 8 The officer must have either
observed the motorist's speed, as detected by radar, or received a radio
message from the officer who observed the radar-measured speed.59 In
the latter case, specific identification of the offending vehicle is re-
quired." These special warrantless arrest provisions have been prompted
by a concern61 that such arrests might otherwise be illegal under the stat-
utes governing misdemeanor arrests.62
2. Warning Signs--Six states"" currently require the posting of warn-
ing or informational signs regarding the use of radar speed detection de-
vices. The wording of these signs is sometimes unspecified by the statute,
and it is unclear whether the statutory purpose is to inform64 the public
55 E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 8176.5 (Supp. 1970).
56 E.g., MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.15 (1967). Without a special statutory ex-
ception, an arrest by a "chase" officer in a two-man radar situation would be contrary
to law. See note 5 supra.
57 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.058 (Supp. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-7,108.02 (Supp.
1968); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-03-15 (Supp. 1971); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.091
(Baldwin 1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.112 (4) (1971-72); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-198
(b) (1972).
58 Both elements are required in Nebraska, North Dakota, and Virginia. Oregon
does not require the officer to display his badge. See note 57 supra.
59 See note 57 supra.
60 Of the six states with such provisions, only North Dakota does not prescribe
specific identification in radio dispatches regarding speeding violations.
61 See, e.g., 1966 FLA. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 066-98.
62 See generally Forkosch, supra note 5, at 137.
63 GA. CODE ANN. § 68-2105 (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE. art. 35, § 91 (1957);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.112 (5) (1971-72); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 1002 (d.1) (1)
(iii), (3) (1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-198.2 (1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 176C-6-7
(1966). Ohio and Maine eliminated similar sections in 1968.
In United States v. Dreos, 156 F. Supp. 200 (D. Md. 1957), the court referred to
the requirement that radar signs be posted pursuant to the Maryland statute and Sec-
tion 3.28(d) of the National Capital Parks Regulation, 36 C.F.R. § 3.28(d) (1955). This
section allowed the use of radar in park areas in the states of Maryland and Virginia
provided signs stating "Speed checked by radar" were posted within four miles of
the device. The section is not in the current code.
64 Pennsylvania requires signs to be erected "indicating that radar is in operation."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1002 (d.1) (1) (iii) (1971). This wording does not require the
signs to be posted only when radar is in actual operation on the road, or that they
specify "Radar Enforced Now." Commonwealth v. Fornwalt, 203 Pa. Super. 411, 202
A.2d 115 (1964); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 82 Dauph. Co. 153 (Pa. 1964); Common-
wealth v. Giller, 54 Luzerne Leg. Reg. R. 215 (Pa. 1964); Commonwealth v. Wrye, 32
Pa. D. & C.2d 385 (1963); Commonwealth v. Schoenfeld, 54 Luzerne Leg. Reg. R.
213 (Pa. 1963) (Legislative intent was not to warn individuals of radar monitoring.).
Safety cannot be promoted by a system which permits a motorist alert
to warning signs and police cars to speed with assured immunity. The
[VOL. 7:440
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that radar is used in the state to enforce the speed laws or to warn ; dri-
vers in a particular location that speed is being monitored by radar. The
requirement, in some states, that the signs be posted at "conspicious" or
"strategic" places at or near the state border',' suggests a legislative pur-
pose to inform the public of the general use of radar, whereas providing
for "movable" 7 signs suggests an intent to warn drivers of the immedi-
ate possibility of arrest.
3. Proscribed Areas of Use-Three states ban the use of radar in cer-
tain areas. Illinois"" prohibits radar usage within 500 feet of a speed
change sign unless the unit is being operated within a school speed zone.
MississippiW forbids use of radar devices by towns with populations of
less than 2,000, while towns of less than 15,000 people may not use ra-
dar on federal highways. The Mississippi Highway Patrol, however, may
utilize radar anywhere in the state. The Georgia statute prohibits the use of
radar warning signs erected by the Secretary of Highways discourage
speeding even when there is no radar in use in the immediate vicinity
of the sign.
Commonwealth v. Fornwalt, supra at 415 (footnote omitted). The court pointed out
that an amendment which would have provided for signs only when radar was in
operation failed in the legislature.
Oregon and West Virginia specifically state that such signs shall be posted for the
information of the general public. (E.g., West Virginia: "In order to inform and edu-
cate the public generally ....")
65 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 68-2105 (Supp. 1972), which states, "Such signs shall
warn approaching motorists that the use of such devices is being employed" (emphasis
added). Confusion about the purpose of the signs even existed among officials. A
Pennsylvania court noted:
There was a time when even officials became obsessed with the idea that
catching speeders was a game in which the violator had the right to a
"sporting chance." Police cars were painted white so no speeder who
watched through his rear view mirror could be caught. Apprehending
speeders was looked upon as a continuation of the childhood game of
"cops and robbers." Unforunately, highway safety is not a game, but
a deadly serious problem. The attitude of a segment of the public on
highway safety is probably the result of a psychological phenomenon
in which every operator thinks of himself as an occasional traffic vio-
lator but never thinks of himself as being killed or the killer.
Commonwealth v. Fornwalt, 203 Pa. Super. 411, 415 n.2, 202 A.2d 115, 117 n.2
(1964).
66ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.112(5) (1971-72); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-198.2 (1972);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-6-7 (1966).
67 Since West Virginia provides for "movable" signs, it would appear that the pur-
pose is to warn motorists of the current use of radar in that area. Nevertheless, the
statute provides that the purpose is to "inform and educate the public generally",
and such signs shall be "suitable and informative stationary and movable." W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 17C-6-7 (1966).6 SILL. REV. STAT. ch. 9512, § 11-602 (1971). It has been held that the purpose of
this 500 foot "safety range" is to let the driver slow down after a speed change. There-
fore, the prohibition only applies to the use of radar after the first sign. People v.
Johannson, 126 Il. App. 2d 31, 261 N.E.2d 551 (1970). Even though the prohibition
is designed as an affirmative defense, the state still has the burden of proving that the
radar was properly placed in relation to the signs. People v. Russell, 120 11. App. 2d
197, 256 N.E.2d 468 (1970); People v. Powers, 89 Il. App. 2d 120, 233 N.E.2d 93
(1967).
69 MIsS. CODE ANN. § 8176.5 (Supp. 1970).
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radar in a large number of areas.70 These provisions, perhaps more speci-
fic than necessary, are unique in that they take into account many of the
technical limitations of radar and should prevent many possible abuses.71
4. Amount in Excess of Posted Limit-Two states, 72 Georgia and
Pennsylvania, appear to acknowledge the possibility that a radar reading
may be generally accurate and yet subject to some variance. Both states
require that the speed detected by the radar unit be in excess of the legal
speed limit by a certain stated amount. The advantage of such a provision
is that a driver will not be ticketed for speeding when the radar unit.
whose readings are subject to an error of one to four miles per hour,73
indicates that his speed was in excess of the posted limit by less than that
amount.
5. Speed Traps-California7 4 and Oregon 75 prohibit speed traps.76
Both states recognize that the mere use of radar is not a speed trap,77
but neither state appears to have considered the possibility that radar, like
any other legitimate method of speed detection, could be used in such a
way as to constitute a speed trap. Georgia has considered the possibility of
misuse and statutorily prohibited it 78
70 GA. CODE ANN. § 68-2101 et seq. (Supp. 1972). These areas include the 300 feet
following a speed reduction sign and any place where the legal speed limit has been
reduced in the previous thirty days. Other prescribed locations are where the unit is
not visible to approaching motorists for at least 500 feet, where there is a grade in
excess of 7 percent, or where police and court revenues are subsidized by traffic fines.
71 Id. Local governmental units may use radar only upon approval of their applica-
tions to the state. The application must name the streets upon which the radar will be
operated and the current speed limits on those streets.
72 GA. CODE ANN. § 68-2101 (Supp. 1972) ("unless speed of the vehicle exceeds
the posted limit in excess of 10 miles per hour"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1002 (d.l)
(1) (iv) (1971) ("the speed recorded is six or more miles per hour in excess of the legal
speed limit.").
73 Carosell & Coombs, supra note 1, at 333-39. The effect of the "standard error"
of radar is that a driver accused of traveling at sixty-six miles per hour in a sixty-
mile-per-hour zone may in fact be traveling at only sixty-two miles per hour. This
possibility would urge leniency in administering the penalty for driving six miles per
hour over the legal limit. An additional factor is that most American automobile
speedometers register four and one-half to six miles per hour faster than the actual
speed when traveling at sixty miles per hour. Evans, supra note 17, at 281 n.57.
While mens rea plays no part in the strict liability crime of speeding, it does not
seem unfair to punish a motorist, who thinks he is traveling at between sixty-six and
one-half and sixty-eight miles per hour, for exceeding the sixty-mile-per-hour speed
limit by six miles per hour, when in fact he may only be exceeding it by two miles
per hour.
7 4 CAL. VEH. CODE § 751 (1971).
75 ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.112(4) (1971-72).
76 One author has suggested a reason for the enactment of the California law.
Small towns would mark out distances on the highways and nonuniformed, hidden
officers would compute the elapsed time of motorists. The unwary were often ar-
rested, convicted, and fined large sums which often subsidized police salaries. Note,
Criminal Law: Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Radar Speed Meter, 43 CALIF.
L. REV. 710, 711 (1955).
77 ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.112(4) (1971-72); People v. Beamer, 130 Cal. App. 2d
874, 279 P.2d 205 (1955).
78 GA. CODE ANN. § 68-2101 (Supp. 1972) (Radar devices may not be used in
municipalities where traffic fines subsidize police and judicial salaries.).
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B. Evidentiary Provisions
1. Approval of Radar-Every state with a radar regulation statute has
impliedly acknowledged the general reliability of radar. Most states,
however, have specific language approving the use of radar to identify
speeders. Seven states employ almost identical language in generally ap-
proving the use of radar,7 1 while others require that the type of radar
used must be prescribeds) or approved 8 l by an appropriate administra-
tive official. Only three states having radar regulation statutes! fail to ap-
prove, in specific statutory language, the use of radar speed detection de-
vices. Specific approval has been achieved in two of these, however,
through judicial interpretation of their statutes or by judicial notice of
radar's general reliability.8 s
2. Presumption of Accuracy-Five states with radar statutes8 4 provide
that a radar reading of a driver's speed is prima facie evidence of that
speed in a criminal prosecution. Other states provide that speed may be
"proved" by radar evidence,85 that evidence obtained in contravention of
the statute is inadmissible to prove guilt,"" or that "certificates of accu-
racy" of the radar unit may be introduced to establish the accuracy of the
radar readings. 87 Three other states s with radar statutes make no pro-
vision for the evidentiary effect of speed determination by radar.
Although these statutes make radar readings only prima facie evidence
of speed, the practical effect for the typical defendant, who is unable to
produce evidence indicating the unit's inaccuracy, is to establish accuracy
conclusively. s: This statutory pattern expedites prosecution of traffic vi-
olations in congested state courts by discouraging defendants from per-
79 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1254 (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 91
(1957); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-7, 108.02 (Supp. 1968); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-03-15
(Supp. 1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8176.5 (Supp. 1970); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-198
(1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-6-7 (1966).
80 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1002 (d.1) (1) (i) (1971).
81 GA. CODE ANN. § 68-2101 (Supp. 1972).
8 2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951 , § 11-602 (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8176.5 (Supp.
1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.091 (Baldwin 1971).
83 People v. Abdallah, 82 III. App. 2d 312, 226 N.E.2d 408 (1967); City of East
Cleveland v. Ferell, 168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958).
84 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1254 (Supp. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-7, 108.02
(Supp. 1968); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-03-15 (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-198.1
(1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-6-7 (1966).
85 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 91 (1957).
86 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, § 11-602 (1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-2106
(Supp. 1972).
87 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.058 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1002 (d.1)
(2) (1971).
88 Mississippi, Ohio, and Oregon. There are no reported cases citing the statute in
Mississippi or Oregon, however City of East Cleveland v. Ferell, 168 Ohio St. 298,
154 N.E.2d 630 (1958), makes it clear that radar evidence is sufficient for conviction
without more if there is no rebuttal evidence.
89 If the police have abided by the testing procedure established by statute or ad-
ministrative order, then courts are reluctant to reject the radar results. However, a
defendant is not precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the tests prescribed by
statute or the manner in which they were conducted. Such challenges may encourage
police compliance with testing procedures and prevent abuses due to radar inaccuracy.
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senting their arguments when the evidence against them is based upon
generally reliable radar speed measurements. However, a conclusive pre-
sumption of accuracy also tends to preclude the possibility of raising legiti-
mate objections to the potential misuse of radar by law enforcement
agencies.
3. Operator Expertise-No statute regulating radar usage makes pro-
vision for training or certification of radar operators. ' Cases decided in
states with radar statutes do not speak to the question of operator exper-
tise beyond mentioning that the operator was a member of a police force
empowered by statute to utilize radar speed detection devices. 91
III. PROPOSED UNIFORM RADAR SPEED DETECTION ACT
A. Policy Considerations
Courts have failed to respond in a consistent and thorough fashion to
the phenomenon of radar speed detection. Legislative responses, while
more complete, also lack consistency and tend to remedy only local
abuses. Neither courts nor legislatures have attempted to regulate radar in
light of its limitations so as to maximize benefits and prevent abuses. A
uniform act providing complete regulation of radar speed detection could
increase the effectiveness of traffic law enforcement, improve highway
safety, and promise equal treatment of traffic violators.
The pervasiveness of radar speed detection 2 and the mobility of the
American population require a uniform radar act. It is unfair for a motor-
ist to be convicted on the basis of radar evidence when the radar unit
may be inaccurate or operated by an inexpert officer. 93 Nor is it fair for
a driver to be the victim of a revenue-raising speed trap.9 4 Given the
effect of outside influences on radar readings, 95 a driver should be ac-
quitted if care has not been taken to avoid these effects. Conversely, local
law enforcement agencies should not be precluded from making a valid
arrest based upon an accurate determination of speed made by radar un-
der proper conditions. Furthermore, while the basic standard of proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is the same in every state, the inconsis-
tent weight accorded radar evidence indicates not only the underlying
differences in regulation from state to state, but also the inherent illogic
and inequity of treating the same scientific tool as more trustworthy or
accurate in one state than in another. In light of these considerations and
90 Florida requires any operator of a visual average speed computer recorder
(VASCAR) to be certified as competent before he is able to give testimony regarding
evidence obtained by the use of VASCAR. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.058 (3) (a) (Supp.
1973). For further discussion of VASCAR see People v. Persons, 60 Misc. 2d 803, 303
N.Y.S.2d 728 (1969).
9'See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bartley, 411 Pa. 286, 191 A.2d 673 (1963). But cf.
People v. Abdallah, 82 Ill. App. 2d 312, 226 N.E.2d 408 (1967); City of East Cleveland
v. Ferell, 168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958).
92 See note 2 supra.
93 See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
94 See notes 74-78 and accompanying text supra.
95 See notes 76-79 and accompanying text supra.
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the efforts, undertaken by the Secretary of Transportation, toward revi-
sion of motor vehicle laws, the following Uniform Radar Speed Detection
Act is proposed.
B. Proposed Act: Operational Elements
The first part of the act concerns the actual operation of radar by law
enforcement agencies in the field.
Section 1. The speed of any motor vehicle may be measured
by the use of radar or other similar electronic speed detection
device of a type which has been tested and found to be reli-
able by the State Department of _ and
approved by the Department after a public hearing.96
Section 1 authorizes the use of radar speed detection devices, but, as a
safeguard, prevents police from using untested and therefore possibly un-
reliable speed detection devices. The section eliminates the need for ju-
dicial notice of radar's reliability and, to the extent that the state sets a
high standard for accuracy, prohibits the continued use of any particularly
error-prone equipment.
Section 2. No radar or electronic speed detection device may
be utilized unless tested, calibrated, and found accurate accord-
ing to procedures prescribed by the State Department of
_ Such testing and calibration
shall be performed within a period of one week immediately
prior to and one week immediately subsequent to the alleged
violation. At least two additional tests, of a type to be specially
prescribed by the Department, shall be conducted at or near
the time and place of the alleged violation. A log book shall be
maintained for each device indicating the location, date, times,
and results of all such tests. Further, each log book shall in-
clude the location, date, time, weather conditions, and speed
measured by the device for each alleged violation. 97
This section, by avoiding specification of the kinds of accuracy tests to be
performed, allows an expert agency to prescribe the precise procedures
that will adequately safeguard the public interest and to change the tests
as conditions warrant. The inclusion of time constraints within which the
unit must be calibrated is based upon expert recommendations, as is the
requirement for tests when and where any arrest is made. Onsite testing
is necessary to determine whether any effects have been caused by other-
wise undiscernible environmental conditions. 9
Section 3. Only traffic law enforcement officers who have been
trained in a program of instruction, established by the State
Department of , in the use
96 This language is modeled after the Pennsylvania and Virginia statutes. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1002 (d.1) (1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-198 (1972). The name
of the approving department is left blank here.
97 See Kopper, supra note 1, at 353.
98 See notes 38-46 and accompanying text supra.
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of radar or other electronic speed detection devices shall be
competent to operate such devices. 99
This provision would eliminate many of the abuses now affecting the over-
all usefulness of radar. Programs of instruction in proper radar usage
could be established by the states. The program should require sufficient
training to prepare an officer to operate his equipment under all condi-
tions normally encountered. Reading a short instructional manual and
spending a day in a training session with an experienced operator should
be adequate instruction. 100
Section 4. Radar or other electronic speed detection devices
may not be operated by any law enforcement agency in any
location designated by the State Department of
, including, but not limited to, any
area within 500 feet of the first posted sign indicating a reduc-
tion in the legal speed limit. In designating areas in which ra-
dar may not be operated, the department shall consider the
effect exerted on such devices by the operation of radio, tele-
vision, diathermy and other radar or electronic devices, and any
other environmental factor which might affect the accuracy of
such devices in that area. 10 1
The exclusion of some areas from radar patrols will limit outside influ-
ences which would otherwise lead to inaccurate readings. 10
2
Section 5. Signs to inform the traveling public that the speed of
motor vehicles may be measured by radar or other electronic
speed detection devices 'shall be erected and maintained in a
conspicuous place at or near the corporate limits of the local
governmental unit utilizing such devices upon each state high-
way and arterial thoroughfare entering the governmental unit,
and in a conspicuous place at or near the boundary line of this
state upon those interstate and primary highways which connect
the state to other jurisdictions. 0 3
99 There is no parallel section in any of the thirteen radar statutes.
100 Carosell and Coombs suggest that only radar technicians should be permitted to
operate radar speed detection devices. Carosell & Coombs, supra note 1, at 349. Kop-
per would allow anyone with one hour of experience to operate such units. Kopper,
supra note 1, at 353. This section provides for a middle ground as envisioned by most
courts.
101 The first part of this section is modeled after the Illinois statute. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 951/2, § 11-602 (1971). The additional provisions are suggested by writings of
Kopper. Kopper, supra note 1, at 351.
102 Many of the horror stories associated with radar are the result of outside in-
fluences whose effect could have been foreseen and eliminated. The portion of the
Georgia statute requiring any application for a permit to use radar to include the
names of the streets to be patrolled is one possible method to alert the licensing
agency to the presence of these outside energy sources. In addition, the expert agency
should establish that radar units must be set up within three feet of the edge of the
road to minimize the effect of any "cosine factor." Carosell & Coombs, supra note 1,
at 323; 11 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 35 (Supp. 1972).
103 Oregon and West Virginia provide the general model for this language. ORE.
REV. STAT. § 483.112(4) (1971-72); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-6-7 (1966).
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If the threat of detection by radar is to deter speeding, then drivers should
be informed of the use of radar within the state. This end is served by
erecting signs at well-traveled places. A permanent sign encourages the
motorist not only to slow down where the sign is posted, but also to re-
spect the lawful speed limit throughout the state.
Section 6. The driver of any motor vehicle may be arrested
without a warrant under this act, provided that the arresting of-
ficer is in uniform, displays his badge of authority, and
(a) has observed the measurement of the speed of such
motor vehicle by radar or other electronic speed detection
device, or
(b) has received a radio message from the officer who
has observed the speed of the motor vehicle measured by
such device, which message
(i) must be dispatched immediately after the speed
of the motor vehicle was measured,
(ii) must include the license number or other positive
identification of the vehicle, and
(iii) must specify the measured speed.10 4
This provision for warrantless arrest eases the burden otherwise placed
on law enforcement agencies in radar cases. The provision for specific
identification protects drivers from unfair arrests.
C. Proposed Act: Evidentiary Elements
The second part of the act concerns judicial treatment of various ev-
identiary elements of a speeding prosecution based on radar detection.
Section 7. In any court or legal proceeding in which the speed
of a motor vehicle is at issue, the results of measurements by
radar or other electronic speed detection devices made pursuant
to this act shall be accepted as prima facie evidence of the speed
of the motor vehicle.' 0 5
This section ensures the usefulness of radar results. Similar language has
been upheld as not in violation of the due process clause, 106 because of
the natural and evidentiary relation existing between the results of a ra-
dar determination of speed and the true speed of the motor vehicle. The
section obviates the need for judicial notice of or expert testimony on the
reliability of radar.
Section 8. In any court or legal proceeding in which any ques-
tion arises as to the calibration or accuracy of radar or other
electronic speed detection device, a certified copy of the log
104 Ohio and other states with similar arrest provisions provide the model for this
language. See Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.091 (Baldwin 1971).
105 The Virginia statute is a model for this language. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-198
(1972).
106 Dooley v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 32, 92 S.E.2d 348 (1956), appeal dismissed,
354 U.S. 915 (1957); Royals v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 876, 96 S.E.2d 812 (1957).
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book maintained on such device shall be prima facie evidence
of the device's accuracy, provided that
(a) the log book has been executed and signed by the offi-
cers calibrating, testing, or operating such device,
(b) the log book contains information indicating the accuracy
of the testing apparatus used in each test,
(c) the log book is maintained in accordance with the require-
ments of this act, and
(d) the certified copy of the log book is attested to by any
officer who executed and signed it.10
This section will help expedite the trial of radar cases and protect the
defendant by requiring repeated scientific checks of the radar device. The
maintenance and admission into evidence of a log book provide greater
information concerning the accuracy of the individual radar unit, while
not materially increasing the administrative burdens of the traffic law en-
forcement agency.
Section 9. No conviction shall be based upon evidence obtained
through the use of radar or other electronic speed detection
device unless the speed measured is at least six miles per hour
in excess of the legal speed limit.10 8
Since the average radar device has a "standard error" of approximately
one to four miles per hour, 1 9' this section ensures that a defendant con-
victed of exceeding the speed limit by six miles per hour is at least guilty
of the lesser-included offense of exceeding the limit by two miles per
hour.
IV. CONCLUSION
The promulgation and adoption of a uniform act regulating the use of
radar speed detection devices and specifying their evidentiary value will
accomplish a number of socially desirable goals. It will maximize the
benefits of radar usage, increasing the efficiency of traffic law enforcement
and deterring speeding violations. Adoption of the act will minimize the
technical limitations inherent in any scientific device used in a variety of
situations and will reduce the abuses of radar detection systems by re-
quiring the training of expert operators. The proposed act will provide
uniform law and consistent treatment of evidence of similar misconduct.
If highways are to be made safer, there must be systematic and effective
enforcement of speed restrictions according to procedures regulated by a
statutory scheme that protects the rights of the motorist.
-Douglas M. Tisdale
107 The Virginia statute provides the basis for this language. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 46.1-198 (al) (1972).
108 This section is modeled after the Pennsylvania statute. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75,
§ 1002 (d. 1) (1971).
109 See notes 72-73 and accompanying text supra.
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